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A Triangular Contest of Power on the 
Tea-Horse Road:
The Tang Dynasty, Tibetan Empire, and 
the Nanzhao Kingdom
Lejiu Sun (Wake Forest University)
Introduction
 The Tea-Horse Road hardly makes it into the maps of 
the Silk Road. When it does, it is often shown as a road con-
necting the Indian Ocean with the Chinese empire. This paper 
seeks to contribute to the current scholarly conversation by 
examining how this road functioned as a regional network. 
Focusing on the period from the seventh to the ninth centuries, 
the paper explores how the Tea-Horse Trade shaped and was 
shaped by the relationships among the Tang dynasty, Nanzhao 
kingdom, and the Tibetan Empire which governed the re-
gions of modern-day Yunnan, Sichuan, and Tibet. These states 
formed a triangular relationship of contest and confrontation, 
each hatching strategies to capitalize on the trade along the Tea-
Horse Road and to strengthen their standing in comparison to 
the other two competitors.
Before 755
 Before 755, an unbalanced triangular contest of power 
appeared on the Tea-Horse Road.  The Tang (618-907), found-
ed by Li Yuan (the Emperor Gaozu), and the Tibetan Empire 
(634-842), founded by King Songtsen Gampo, had matching 
military strengths and flourished and declined roughly at the 
same pace.Nanzhao, however, was a newcomer to the competi-
tion, emerging as an independent state only in 738. During 
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the first century and a half of their existence, the Tang dynasty 
and the Tibetan Empire formed an alliance through the mar-
riages of two Tang princesses to Tibetan Kings. This was a 
diplomatic strategy known as Heqin (和亲), which had been 
practiced by Chinese courts since the Han dynasty (206 BCE-
220 CE). Both powers were leading players on the Tea-Horse 
Road. The first Heqin marriage happened in 641, when Prin-
cess Wencheng of Tang married King Songtsen Gampo of the 
Tibetan Empire. This marriage ushered in an era of free trade 
between the two states by allowing Tibetan merchants to sell 
their herds and handcrafts in exchange for Chinese silk, iron-
ware, and especially, tea. The rise of tea drinking as a popular 
custom among Tibetan elite and Buddhist monks shortly after 
its introduction from Tang China was partially due to the belief 
that tea had the property to eliminate toxins in dairy and barley, 
the staple Tibetan diet. According to Chinese sources dated to 
the Ming period, the Tibetans admired tea, for tea was the only 
food that healed diseases and allergy caused by eating dairy 
products. Moreover, Tibetans, as most nomadic people, con-
sumed a lot of cheese, andtea could balance the monotonous 
diet and prevent Tibetans from getting sick easily.1 Considering 
both benefits, Tibetan doctors defined tea as  medicine, and 
consequently, tea-drinking culture began to prevail among the 
Tibetan upper class and Buddhists.2 Tea later became the top 
product traded on the Tea-Horse Road.  
 In 710, Princess Jincheng’s marriage with King Me 
Agtsom elevated the relationship between the Tibetan Em-
pire and Tang to an “Uncle-Nephew” level. According to the 
Tibetan classic A Scholar’s Feast, Tibetan King Trisong Detsen 
claimed himself to be the son of prince Jincheng and called Han 
Chinese male adults “uncles” when he was one year old.3 This 
story, despite its great exaggeration of King Trisong Detsen’s 
intelligence, hinted that after the Heqin of Prince Jincheng, the 
Tibetan Empire respected the Tang as a nephew would to an 
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uncle.
 This close relationship culminated in a government-
controlled horse and tea exchange. In 729, at the request of the 
Tibetan Empire, the two states began a routinized government-
led horse and tea exchange through a mechanism known as the 
“tea-horse trade market’’ (茶马互市 Cha ma hu shi). Through 
this exchange, the volume of trade was negotiated and con-
firmed equally by both Tang and Tibetan governments. Accord-
ing to The New Book of Tang (dating to the 11th century), the 
Tibetan Empire requested that they be permitted to present 
horses as tributes to the Tang at Mount Chilin in present day 
Riyue Lake, Qinghai, and also requested to open markets for 
trade at Mount Gansong, in present day Songpan, Sichuan. As 
their messages reached the Tang court, the Tang prime minister 
Pei Guangting (裴光庭) weighed in on the proposals. Because 
Mount Gansong was near the Chinese central plains, having Ti-
betans stationed there for trade would pose a potential security 
threat; Pei suggested setting the exchange at Chilin, which was 
approved by Emperor Xuanzong.  The emperor then com-
manded Li Quan -- the General of Imperial Insignia (金吾将
军李佺) -- to supervise the erection of a stone stele at Chilin to 
mark the border between the two empires. The emperor further 
summoned Zhang Shougui (张守珪), General Li Xiaoyi (李孝
逸), and the Tibetan envoy Khu Mangpoje (莽布支) to carry 
his edict to Jiannan and Hexi Circuits that governed the Tang 
domains bordering with Tibet, which says: “Henceforth our 
two countries shall remain in harmony and peace. There should 
be no aggression and violence towards each other.”4
 In response to this agreement, both states established 
institutions which actively prepared for the tea-horse exchange. 
The Tibetan Empire recruited a group of five Han merchants —
the  Han di wu cha shang (汉地五茶商 “Five Chinese Tea Trad-
ers”) who specialized in conducting the tea-horse trade.5 The 
“Five Chinese Tea Traders” conducted state-oriented trade to 
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make sure the revenue from tea-horse exchanges was funneled 
back to the Tibetan government and facilitated the cultural 
exchange between the Tibetan Empire and Tang. 
 The Tang also established the Institute for Tea-Horse 
Exchange (茶马交换所 Cha ma jiao huan suo) in Anduo (安
多) as an official market. A government-led trading system on 
the Sichuan-Tibet road emerged, and the tea-horse trade that 
passed through it seemed unstoppable. Since 731, each time the 
border markets were opened, both the Tang and Tibetan Em-
pire would send a governor to take charge of the shipment of 
their goods to the designated market. The goods were restricted 
to just tea and horses. Such a win-win exchange took place no 
less than 191 times in 116 years (from 731 to 846). During this 
time Tang sent its officers to Tibet 66 times, while Tibet sent 
its ambassadors to the Tang 125 times. By 731, the Tibetan 
government had imported so much tea through the Tea-Horse 
Exchange Markets that tea became affordable for the common 
Tibetans. From then on it gradually became an indispensable 
part of the Tibetan diet (see Map 1 below).6
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Map One: the Chuan (Sichuan)-Tibet Road
 The eruption of tensions towards the mid-eighth century 
between Tang and the Tibetan empire interfered with their trade, 
and the nascent Nanzhao Kingdom was drawn into the conflict, 
resulting in the formation of an unbalanced triangular power relation 
in the region. In 737, a war broke out between Tang and the Tibetan 
empire. While Tang was still able to import horses from its stud-farms 
in Longyou, the Tibetan empire needed to find another tea-producing 
country to substitute for Tang.7
 In 750, Nanzhao, formerly known as Mengsheman (蒙舍
蛮), a loose cluster of tribes that collectively sent tribute to the Tang 
court, was unified by King Piluoge (阁罗凤) in 649.  No longer 
willing to suffer the brutal governance by Zhang Qiantuo (张虔
陀), the Tang prefecture in Yunnan rebelled. King Geluofeng, who 
led this rebellion, killed Zhang Qiantuo.8 When the Tang general 
Xian Yuzhongtong (鲜于仲通) led an attack on Nanzhao, Nanzhao 
turned to ally with the Tibetan Empire.9  Nanzhao was a traditional 
tea-producing country, where tea bushes were found throughout the 
mountains within the limits of Yinsheng city (银生城). The locals 
did not develop an industry of growing and preparing tea for remote 
markets, but harvested it for their own consumption. They brewed 
and drank the tea with Sichuan pepper, ginger, and cinnamon.10 
Noticing this potential tea-provider, the Tibetan Empire generously 
sent 600,000 soldiers to assist Nanzhao, won the battle against the 
Tang, and granted Nanzhao the title “brother-like state,” the name 
“Eastern Emperor” and a golden seal to the King of Nanzhao.11
 In order to import tea from Nanzhao, the Tibetan empire 
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opened the trade route from Dali in Nanzhao to Lhasa in 
Tibet. The Tibetan empire also established the Shenzhou 
Commandery (Iron Bridge Commandery) at the border to 
take control of the tea export in Nanzhao. The Shenzhou 
Iron Bridge was located at present day Ta Cheng, which had 
previously been a military station between the Tibetan Empire 
and Nanzhao. In 703, the Tibetan king built the Shenzhou Iron 
Bridge across the Jinsha River (金沙江, the river on the border 
between Nanzhao and the Tibetan Empire). After Nanzhao 
betrayed Tang, the Tibetan Empire left its troops in the city of 
Ta Cheng. As the war ended, two cities named as the Eastern 
and Western Iron Bridge Cities (铁桥城 the city of iron bridge) 
developed around this bridge, and these two cities functioned 
as the trading ports between Nanzhao and the Tibetan Empire. 
Noticing this economic benefit, the Tibetan Empire dispatched 
troops and officers to establish the Shenzhou Commandery 
in the Western Iron Bridge City.12 As a frontier juncture, the 
Shenzhou Commandery held the barracks of Tibetan troops 
who carried on the mission of protecting the Shenzhou Iron 
Bridge, monitoring Tang and Nanzhao, and representing 
the alliance between the Tibetan Empire and Nanzhao. As a 
governmental institution, the Shenzhou Commandery served 
as the gate on the Dian (modern day Yunnan)-Tibet Road 
to collect heavy taxes from traders, maintain the safety of 
international mercantile activities, and control exportation and 
importation of tea in Nanzhao. The Shenzhou Commandery 
symbolized the Tibetan Empire’s authoritarian control over 
the Dian-Tibet trade route. Not capable of standing up to its 
neighbor, Nanzhao was taken advantage of economically by the 
Tibetan Empire. 
 However, even without the ability to control the trading 
center in the Iron Bridge Cities, Nanzhao still benefited from 
this Tibet-led trading system. With the help of the Tibetan 
government, the Dian-Tibet trade route was systemized with 
its center in the Iron Bridge cities. On this Dian-Chuan road, 
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it was still Han Chinese merchants who transported tea, the main 
goods, mostly from Yunnan, but sometimes from Sichuan, to Tibetan 
towns and cities, sold them to Tibetan merchants. Reciprocally, 
merchants returned with horses, herbs and other agricultural 
products from Tibet for resale in major trading cities in Nanzhao, 
such as Lijiang, Dali and Kunming.13 According to Manshu, Tibetan 
merchants also frequently visited these cities to trade.14  Scattered 
trading cities like Dali, Lijiang, Zhongdian, Deqin and Kunming 
were connected by these traveling merchants. The sophisticated 
trading network economically unified the Nanzhao Kingdom (See 
Map 2). Some of the trading cities accumulated wealth, which would 
support Nanzhao’s development after 755.
Map Two: the Dian-Tibet Road 
 The period before 755, therefore, can be seen as the age 
of unbalanced triangular competition and confrontation on the 
Tea-Horse Road. The first century and half witnessed similar 
developments happening in both Tang and the Tibetan Empire. 
Nanzhao acted as a vassal state of either the Tang or Tibetan Empire, 
but also actively prepared for its own rise. None of the three states 
fully dominated the trade; all had their gains and losses. Government 
control, in the form of Tea-Horse Exchange policies or heavy 
taxation, already appeared on the Tea-Horse Road, but this seems to 
have primarily been driven by political reasons.
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After 755
 From 755 to 866, the Tang and Tibetan Empires both 
declined due to internal and external threats. This opened up an 
opportunity for Nanzhao to grow. As state power became more 
equally distributed among the three partners, each state shifted 
their trading purpose from political game-play to economic 
recovery. In 755, the An Lushan Rebellion devastated Tang’s 
military and economy. Seizing the opportunity, the Tibetan 
Empire, under the leadership of King Trisong Detsen, moved to 
control the Longyou horse ranches, forcing the Tang to import 
horses and borrow cavalry from its northern neighbor Uyghurs 
at higher prices.15 Simultaneously, Nanzhao troops, under King 
Geluofeng (阁罗凤), conquered the Juan perfection (巂州) of 
Tang in its northwest.16 As a result, the Tang Court, desperately 
in need of money, had to use the Tea-Horse Road trade to 
enrich its treasury. 
 Starting in 782, Tang levied taxes on tea as well as 
on lacquer, wood and bamboo, something it had never done 
previously.17 The tax was set at one tenth of the value of the 
goods.18 The tea tax effectively provided the Tang government 
with a large financial fund, which could be deployed to 
strengthen Tang’s national defense. The efficacy of this tax came 
from the massive tea-trade between the Tibetan Empire and the 
Tang government. Except for the years of wars between them, 
the two empires continued to carry on their trade. By the year 
781 (under the rule of Trisong Detsen), Tang, with declining 
state power, valued the economic benefit from Tea-Horse Road 
trade more than its political value. 
 Later in 835, at the eve of another war between Tang 
and the Tibetan Empire, Tang rolled out the “Que cha” policy, 
which was first proposed by Wang Ya, who became the first Que 
Cha Shi (榷茶使 Superintendent of Tea Monopoly).19  Tang’s 
Que Cha policy included prohibiting all private tea trade and 
centralizing all processes of making tea - growing, picking, pan 
A Triangular Contest of Power on 
the Tea-Horse Road
Penn History Review     107 
frying, sorting, packing and marketing - under state control. 
The local government established state-run tea plantations, 
abolished private-ownership of tea gardens, and enforced 
moving private tea trees to state-run tea plantations.20 After 
840, under the rule of Emperor Wu of Tang, officer Cui Gong 
revised the Que Cha policy by adding taxes on tea merchants 
passing through every prefecture. After that, tea smuggling 
gradually increased, forcing the Tang to update the Que cha 
policy by adding heavy penalties for tea smugglers. Private 
traders who have dealt more than 300 jin of tea for three times,  
or transported tea over long distances, would be sentenced to 
death.21 This Que Cha policy brought the tea industry under 
state monopoly. This enabled the Tang court to collect all 
revenues from tea production, thereby supporting its treasury 
on a larger scale. Another example could hint at the magnitude 
of the profits reaped by the dynasty and the officials in charge 
of its implementation. Several years after Wang Ya became the 
Superintendent of Tea Monopoly, he was charged with bribery 
and corruption. Soldiers and mobs stormed his estate and 
found tens of thousands of treasures.22
 From taxing this trade to monopolizing it, Tang devised 
increasingly aggressive strategies to profit from the lucrative 
Tea-Horse Road trade. To some degree, these policies sustained 
Tang’s rule for decades, but, as do all expedient means, neither 
tax nor the Que Cha policy fully saved Tang from collapsing. 
They did, however, function as effective innovations that led to 
the systemization of the Tea-Horse Road. 
 To its southwest, after 44 years allying with the 
Tibetan empire, Nanzhao was powerful enough to break this 
relationship. In 794, Tang ambassador Wei Gao (韦皋), after 
trying in vain for five years to persuade Nanzhao to submit to 
the Tang, secretly paid a visit to Nanzhao. Wei Gao presented 
the letter from the Tang Emperor asking Yimouxun (异牟寻), 
the King of Nanzhao, to return the golden seal to the Tibetan 
Empire as a symbol of ending their alliance with Tibet.23 
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Already harboring resentment against the Tibetan Empire, King 
Yimouxun allied with the Tang and promptly occupied sixteen 
major Tibetan cities.24 Among them were the Iron Bridge Cities 
(铁桥城), where the Shenzhou Commandery was located. 
Finally, in 795, when Nanzhao garrisoned in the Youbaluo 
mountain in Xichuan (西川) and Tang stabilized its territory in 
Xizhou (西州), the Dian-Chuan Road was finally opened as the 
third official trade route in the Tea-Horse Road trade region, 
linking Tang’s southwestern frontier region of Chuan in modern 
day Sichuan province with Nanzhao’s major trading centers in 
Dian (namely the modern day Yunnan province).25 See Map 
3, The Dian-Chuan Tea-Horse Road, below. Occupying the 
Shenzhou Commandery, the previous trading center of the 
Tibetan Empire, Nanzhao controlled mercantile activities on 
the road between Yunnan and Tibet. 
Map Three: the Dian-Chuan Road 
 Meanwhile, during the period from 794 to 886, 
Nanzhao maintained an overall peaceful relation with Tang, 
sending 46 missions in total to the Tang court via the Dian-
Chuan Road for gift exchange. On one of these missions, King 
Yimouxun of Nanzhao sent 60 horses as well as 100 Tibetan 
war prisoners to the Tang court to strengthen the friendship. 
In other years the gifts were diverse, including people (mainly 
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slaves, prisoners of war, and artists), animals (mostly horses), 
aromatics and herbs, ores, and other manufactures.26 This 
relationship between Nanzhao and Tang was similar to the 
Tibet-Tang alliance in the early 7th century, in which both 
independent states peacefully exchanged their goods for political 
reasons. Nevertheless, neither Tang nor Nanzhao maintained 
gift-sending missions for economic purposes. For Nanzhao, the 
peaceful relationship with Tang facilitated its trade on the Dian-
Chuan Road. For Tang, Nanzhao could check the expansion of 
the Tibetan Empire and thereout protect its commercial center 
in Sichuan.
 During this period, the Tang and Tibetan empires, 
suffering a decline in their respective powers, invented policies 
to maintain their political influences on the Tea-Horse Road. 
Some of these policies were proven effective and would be 
borrowed by their successors in later period.  For example, 
the taxation on tea and the Que Cha policy invented by the 
Tang for solving its desperate dilemma were later borrowed 
by the Song (960-1279) for the same purpose when dealing 
with Nanzhao’s successor state Dali over issues related to the 
horse-salt exchange between them. Nanzhao, the weakest state 
in the earlier period, had grown to be a major influence on the 
Tea-Horse Road. Each state engaged this trade in a manner 
calculated to reflect its self-understanding of its position in the 
triangular international relationships. Yet, all three states sought 
to gain economic benefit within this triangular contest and 
confrontation on the Tea-Horse Road for economic reasons, in 
contrast to the game-play before 755. 
Conclusion
 From the 7th to the 9th centuries, the triangular contest 
among Tang, Nanzhao and the Tibetan empire gradually 
intensified as each state sought to capitalize on the Tea-
Horse Road trade. Their main purpose of trade shifted from 
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political domination to economic recovery. Their diplomatic 
relationships, either peaceful or hostile, were reflected on the 
Tea-Horse Road exchange among them in the form of trade 
policies, institutions, and shifting road networks See Map 4). 
Map Four: the Map of the Tea-Horse Road 
 The supply and demand relationship of tea and horse 
also resulted in betrayals, invasions and treaties that affected 
diplomacy. While concrete actions taken may have differed, 
each partner to this contest sought the same goal: to strengthen 
itself at the expense of its neighbors by shaping this trade in its 
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favor.
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